

# **CYBER SECURITY FOR GAS MEASURING DEVICES**

**PRODUCT MANAGEMENT** VERSION 03



## **PRESENTATION OVERVIEW**

#### **1.** Cyber security by Design

Honeywell's standard procedures for developing secure products

2. Implemented security measures Examples

#### 3. In preparation

Component certification according to IEC 62443-4-2 for Gas measurement devices  Example for implementing national security requirements
 TSA directive (USA)

# CYBER SECURITY BY DESIGN

Honeywell's standard procedures for developing secure products

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### **SECURE DEVELOPMENT LIFECYCLE PROCESS**

- The Honeywell Process Solution (HPS) Product Security Center of Excellence (CoE) has implemented a Secure Development Life Cycle (SDLC) for all products being developed.
- Aim is to ensure that security is built into HPS systems and not included as an afterthought security mechanisms and controls are treated the same way as other development items.



### SDLC – COMPLIANT TO IEC 62443-4-1

- Honeywell Process Solution (HPS) has achieved a SDLA Certification<sup>1)</sup> for the standard development process that certifies compliance to IEC 62443 Part 4-1: Secure product development lifecycle requirements.
- In addition, HPS uses BSIMM (Building Security In Maturity Model) as an additional framework for security improvement and organizational capability measurement
- The European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is also supported.



- 1) <u>https://www.isasecure.org/en-US/End-Users/IEC-62443-4-1-Certified-Development-Organizations</u>
- 2) <u>A study of current software security initiatives or programs of different organizations across industries, sizes, and geographies.</u>
- 3) GDPR website

### **SDLC – WORK PERFORMED BY LIFECYLE PHASE**

- Inception: During establishing the scope of the project, security requirements are identified and are added to the project's Requirement Repository.
- Elaboration: Primary objectives are to mitigate critical technical risks and to develop an executable architecture.
- Construction: Design and implementation may identify assets to be added to the Threat Model.
- Transition: Product packages and components are signed using a certificate to ensure that the end user can verify the integrity and authenticity of the product.
- Any Time (lifecycle phase independent): At any time, when an anomaly is fixed, it is determined if the fix could affect the security of the product. If so, the anomaly and its fix is analyzed to determine how to address any security issues.

### **SDLC – SECURITY ROLES**

- Security Architect (Project role): Guide the team on architectural requirements from a security standpoint as well as provide design guidance based on a good working knowledge of cyber-security.
- Security Tester (Project role): Have an understanding of cyber security attacks and special training on using security testing tools.
- Master Security Architect (Organizational role): They are responsible for providing consulting and mentoring to Security Architects; providing final approval on threat models; and determining resolutions for unmitigated security issues encountered by the Security architect.
- Master Security Tester (Organizational role): Responsible for providing consulting and mentoring to Security Testers and providing guidance on Security testing tools.

### **SDLC – KEY WORK PRODUCTS**

- Requirements Repository: Security Requirements and Non-Functional Requirements that are based on Master Security Requirements (MSR). The security requirements relevant for the project are selected and added to the project's requirement repository.
- Software Architecture Document: Includes information about how the system is architected to fulfill a set of Architecturally Significant Requirements which may include security requirements that need special handling in the architecture.
- Threat Model: Security map of the level of risk in the application
  - Security assets: Defining the location of potential attacks
  - Threats: Information on how the system might be misused
  - Controls: Mechanisms to mitigate the possible threats; additional requirements or architecture and design elements to be implemented and tested as part of standard product development.

### **SDLC – KEY WORK PRODUCTS**

- Static Code Analysis Reports: Used to mitigate implementation-level security risks. They are created and analyzed for each system build.
- Test Plan Security Verification Testing: Includes a section on Security Verification Testing which includes a list of test targets and security verification test types (e.g., Penetration Testing) that are planned to be performed in each iteration.
- Security Test Evaluation Summary: Describes the results of the security tests.
- Security Documentation Checklist: When writing user documentation, a security checklist is used to ensure that appropriate security information is included for each of the information types that make up the User Assistance deliverables.
- Change Request: Impact Analysis of a change request identifies whether security is impacted either by the change requested or by the fix.

### **SDLC – SECURITY FINAL REVIEW & CTO SIGNOFF**

- After the individual security reviews, a final review is conducted and submitted to the CTO for approval.
- All products and service offerings containing software or firmware must obtain cybersecurity approval of the CTO prior to being placed into production of offered for customer use.

Security Reviews				
Planning	Definition	Implementation	Deployment	: Final
Review			Status	Progress
Security Planning Review			Approved	→
Security Architecture Revie	W		Approved	→
Requirements Review			Approved	→
Security Testing Review			Approved	→
Data Privacy Review			Approved	→
Security Implementation R	eview		Approved	→
Supply Chain Security Revi	ew		Approved	→
Information Development S	Security Review		Approved	→
Deployment Review			Approved	→
Security Final Review			Approved	→

#### A product cannot be launched without final CTO Signoff

### **SECURITY OF THIRD-PARTY COMPONENTS**

- Honeywell ensures that the product development life-cycle processes for components from a third-party supplier conform to the SDLA security requirements when developed specifically for Honeywell or have an impact on security or require ISA Secure certification.
- The Security architect must verify that suppliers meet the same SDLC levels as HPS prior to engaging them in a development effort based on the criteria above.

### **VULNERABILITY MANAGEMENT**

- Cyber security vulnerabilities are reported to the HPS Product Security Group through two primary methods: internal disclosure and external disclosure.
  - Internal discovery of cyber security vulnerabilities is typically triggered by: Security Assessments or security testing, Threat Models, Static Code Analysis and code reviews or Design or Architectural Reviews
  - External discovery of cyber security vulnerabilities is typically triggered by: Black hat or white hat security researchers, Hackers, Customers, Media coverage
- Vulnerabilities are managed via defect reports which are logged into Honeywell's defect management systems and prioritized to identify the release in which a resolution or fix will be available.

# **IMPLEMENTED SECURITY MEASURES**

Examples

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### **COMPLEX PASSWORDS + LOGIN ATTEMPTS**

- Security gap : Short (up to 5 digits long) and simple (numeric) PINs were often implemented in gas measurement devices. These do not sufficiently protect the device from unauthorized access.
- Solution: In addition to requiring long (usually greater than 8 characters) and complex (alphanumeric + special characters) passwords (or secrets), the number of failed authentication attempts for a subscriber's account needs to be limited.
- Example: Secrets according to NIST SP 800-63B Authentication and Lifecycle Management

#### Ensure that someone is who they say they are before granting access

### **ENCRYPTED DATA COMMUNICATION**

- Security gap: Data including access information such as device passwords, PIN for SIM cards, etc. are transmitted as plain text and can be both eavesdropped and manipulated without the user being able to detect this.
- Solution: Encrypted data transmission ensures that no third party can eavesdrop or tamper with any message
- Example: Transport Layer Security (TLS).
  A cryptographic protocol for encrypted data transmission providing privacy (confidentiality), integrity and authenticity using certificates between two or more

communication partners.

#### Protect data from eavesdropping and tampering

### **SECURE BOOT**

- Security gap: Remote update functions allow devices to be kept up to date without the need for a visit to the station. But how do you guarantee that a device is only using firmware that is intended for it and has not been tampered with?
- Solution: Firmware authenticity verification mechanism using a cryptographic algorithm.



#### Ensure that the device only starts firmware that is trusted

# IN PREPARATION

Component certification according to IEC 62443-4-2 for Gas measurement devices

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### **COMPONENT CERTIFICATION ACC. IEC 62443**

- More and more customers and authorities are asking for secure measurement devices, but without providing an exact definition or naming a standard.
- Therefore, it is difficult for us as a manufacturer to specify the required measures and for the user to assess the implemented level of security.
- We decided to achieve a to achieve a component certification according to IEC 62443-4-2 (secure industrial automation and control systems) for the Honeywell Gas measurement products.

### EXAMPLE FOR IMPLEMENTING NATIONAL SECURITY REQUIREMENTS

**TSA directive (USA)** 

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### **TSA COMPLIANT ECOSYSTEM**



Complex password:

- Hash passwords are stored and exchanged between devices and PC software independent from the used password complexity (also for current PINs).
- Password verification is done in the encrypted format.

#### TLS 1.2 data encryption:

• Use is not mandatory (switched on/off)

### **FEATURES PER PRODUCT**

Feature	CloudLink 100	CloudLink 110	CloudLink 5G	350 series	MasterLink	PowerSpring
Complex Password	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Secure Boot	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
TLS 1.2 Server <sup>1)</sup>	No	No	Yes	NA	NA	Yes
TLS 1.2 Client <sup>2)</sup>	No	No	Yes	NA	Yes	Yes

<sup>1)</sup> TLS Server: TLS server will validate the incoming connection by verifying certification used by the TLS client.
 <sup>2)</sup> TLS Client: TLS client will go and connect to TLS server; TLS client will share the supported TLS encryption algorithm to TLS server.

### **COMPLEX PASSWORD**

# Guideline for creating complex password

- Minimum 8 characters length
- Maximum 15 characters length
- At least one special character
- At least one numeric
- At least one capital letter

#### Password throttling (already in place in EC350)

- After entering an incorrect password three times continuously, the user must wait 3 minutes before entering the password again.
- After entering an incorrect password three more times, the user must wait 5 minutes. This goes until 25 minutes and the user will be locked.
- In this case, the Admin must generate a new password for the user to login again.

#### Secure operation due to Complex password & exponential lockup feature

### **COMPLEX PASSWORD**

#### Using complex passwords

- Initial login is done with default password (numeric).
- User should change the simple password to a complex password.
- Also, the User IDs should be adjusted.
- The user receives a message in MasterLink if the selected password does not meet the NIST requirements.

#### **Technical details**

- Hash password is calculated using SHA256 encryption method
- Nowhere in the system is the plain password stored.
- Verification is done in the encrypted format.



#### Use of complex passwords is the responsibility of the customer

### **COMPLEX PASSWORD**

# ,Show password' function available

MasterL	Link R600.1
Username	Password Password
Forgot Password?	New User
	Show Password

# Hint if PW is to be saved with insufficient complexity

	Integrated device c	onnect		
	EC350 + CloudLink	odem   Serial   Internet	IrDA	
	Integrated Mode			
instrument Type *	EC350 + CloudLink ·	Internet/Phone	None	•
Site Name *	Integrated device		UDP 🔝 SSL	
Site Location	hyd	Site Phone/IP Address		
Site ID *	0000000	SSL Private Key		
Site ID 2 *	0000000	Modem ID	0	
User ID *	0	Modern Port	None	Ť
Instrument Access Code *	····· •	Post Modern Command		
			$(\otimes)$	
	Warning Password strength is	not strong. Do you want to p	roceed?	
	<u>/:</u>	<u> </u>		
		/es No		

# User table with complex passwords

Add User ID      Password      Role        Image: Comparison of the state of the stat	Enable  User ID  Password  Role    Image: Comparison of the system of the syst	Enable      User ID      Password      Role        Image: Construction of the state of	Enable  User ID  Password  Role    Image: Comparison of the state of t	Enable  User ID  Password  Role    Image: Constraint of the state of t	Edit	Enable	User ID	Password	F	2014	Aud User	Delete
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#### Entering has not changed, but system hint if complexity is not sufficient

### **SECURE BOOT**

- 1. On each Power-On, the Secure Boot Loader will take control of the MCU to ensure that the current running application is not compromised (Corrupted FW, Incorrect application).
- 2. Boot loader authenticates current running application by calculating the hash of application and compared to stored hash in memory.
- 3. If Authentication is successful, then only control is passed from Boot Loader to Application for execution.



# THANK YOU

